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So You Want a Nevada Divorce?
By GRAHAM SUSMAN*
Bill Jones' was miserable. For six years he had been separated
from his wife, and for some years prior to their separation, their marital
relationship was far from satisfactory. Constant arguments, fighting,
bickering, nagging and numerous embarrassing situations demonstrated
that the parties were definitely unsuited to each other. But for some
reason, Mrs. Jones wouldn't divorce Bill, nor would she give him the
satisfaction of obtaining a divorce. He .had filed a suit for divorce in
Colorado, and she had filed a cross-complaint for separate maintenance.
The jury had found both parties guilty of cruelty and decreed separate
maintenance to the wife under the authority of Vigil v. Vigil.'
Thereafter, a second suit was filed in Colorado by Jones based on
acts of cruelty occurring since the first trial, which resulted in the denial
of a divorce. It appeared that Bill Jones was destined to remain under
a rather intolerable situation, which became aggravated at the end of
each month, when another payment for his wife was mailed to the
clerk of the district court.
Mrs. Jones was assured of an income for the rest of her life--or for
the rest of his. She had stated in no uncertain terms that she would never
permit Bill to obtain a divorce and that she would fight him "until Hell
freezes." Of course she had no intention of getting a divorce, because if
her husband should remarry, it might affect his ability to continue those
monthly checks.
Jones had been reading the newspapers and had noticed the ease
with which many people severed their marital bonds by a short sojourn
in Nevada. His friends had urged him to go to Reno, where "he could
get a divorce in six weeks." Bill's mind was made up. He would go to
Nevada, bring an end to this marital conflict, and perhaps find some
happiness during the remaining years of his life. Perhaps he had better
*Member of the Denver bar.
Any similarity in name of persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental.
49 Colo. 156, 111 Pac. 833 (1910), 31 L. R. A. (NS) 579 (1911).
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see his attorney, Mr. Barrister,a and discuss this step with him before he
left Colorado.
The next day Bill appeared at the office of his attorney. "Mr. Barrister," he said, "I thought I'd let you know that I'm going to Nevada
and get a divorce there. Before going, I should like to ask you some
questions that have occurred to me."
"Certainly," replied the attorney. "I'd be glad to discuss this with
you. I suppose you know that there is some question as to whether or
not the Nevada decree would be recognized in Colorado."
"But," interrupted Jones, "here is a clipping I cut out of the paper
about a year ago, which says that the United States Supreme Court has
ruled that Nevada divorces must be recognized everywhere under the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. It gives the name of the
'
case: Williams v. North Carolina."
"That case doesn't decide that," replied Barrister. "When the decision was first handed down, newspaper reports conveyed the impression
to the public that all Nevada decrees will be valid everywhere, and must
be recognized by the courts of every other state. This impression is not
correct."
"The Williams case," continued Barrister, "in effect, eliminated
the fiction of law known as 'matrimonial domicile.' In other words, the
Court has said that the forum need no longer inquire into the question of
which party is at fault to determine whether or not the matrimonial
domicile has been brought within the state. However, it did not decide
whether a sister state could inquire into the question of whether or not
there had been a bona fide domicile in Nevada. This question was not
raised in the Williams case, and the Court proceeded on the theory -that
the parties had acquired a permanent abode in Nevada. The Court specifically said:
"Nor do we reach the question as to the power of North Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees because, contrary to the findings of the Nevada Court, North Carolina
finds that no bona fide domicile was acquired in Nevada."
The attorney continued: "As a matter of fact, there have been
many decisions which have specifically passed upon this point since the
ruling in the Williams case. Within a month after the Williams decision,
the supreme court of New York had this very question before it. In the
case of Jiranek u..Jiraneh,5 the husband went to Nevada, stayed there
'See note 1.
'317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. ed. 189 (1942),
(1943).
539 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 523 (Decided Jan. 22, 1943).

143 A. L. R. 1273
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the required six weeks and obtained a decree in his favor on the ground
of cruelty. In an action brought by his wife in New York, the record
of the Nevada court was introduced as a defense to the action. The
court said:
-When a judgment rendered in one state is challenged in
another, want of jurisdiction over either the person or the subject
matter is open to inquiry * * * The nature of the federal union
of states, to which are reserved some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause of the
federal constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 1, to compel one state to subordinate its own laws and policy concerning its domestic affairs to the
laws and policy of other states. * * * The United States Supreme
Court did not hold in Williams v. North Carolina that the bona
fides of the residence or domicile in Nevada of the plaintiff in the
Nevada action could not be challenged in this state because of the
full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution.
"This principle of law has been followed by later decisions of the
New York courts, 6 as well as in the states of Pennsylvania, 7 Ohio,8 New
Jersey, 9 Connecticut,' ° and Massachusetts," but the decree of a foreign
state has been upheld in Illinois 12 and Iowa.'1 And while there are no
Colorado decisions on this identical point of law since the Williams case,
supra, I am inclined to believe that the Colorado courts would follow
14
the weight of authority as exemplified by the New York decisions.
6
McKee v. McKee, 39 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 859 (Decided Feb. 20, 1943) ; In re
Bingham's Will, 39 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 756 (Decided Feb. 1. 1943) ; Oberlander v.
Oberlander, 39 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 139 (Decided Jan. 12, 1943) ; Beitch v. Beitch, 43
N. Y. Supp. (2d) 391 (Decided Mar. 16, 1943) ; In re Lindgren's Estate, 43 N. Y.
Supp. (2d) 143 (Decided June 29, 1943) ; Jolby v. Jolby, 42 N. Y. Supp. (2d)
855 (Decided June 23, 1943); Buvinger v. Buvinger, 42 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 848
(Decided June 7, 1943) ; Fondiller v. Fondiller, 42 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 477 (Decided
Apr. 22, 1943) ; Ammermuller v. Ammermuller, 45 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 654 (Decided
Dec. 13, 1943) ; and many other New York cases to the same effect. But see In re
Fine's Estate, 44 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 62 (Decided Sept. 29, 1943), where the decree
was upheld.
'Commonwealth v. Esenwein, 153 Pa. Superior 69, 33 At. (2d) 675 (Decided
July 16, 1943), where the court said: "Were it not for the misleading press notices
and the generally confused discussion of the Williams case. * * * it would scarcely be
necessary to point out the limited effect of this decision."
'Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N. E. (2d) 889 (1943).
8
Mascola v Mascola, 134 N. J. Eq.
1943) ; Wolff v. Wolff, 134 N. J. Eq. 8.
"Hooker v. Hooker, 130 Conn. 41,
UBowditch v. Bowditch, 314 Mass.

48, 33 At. (2d) 864 (Decided Sept. 17,
34 Al. (2d) 150 (Decided Oct. 4, 1943).
32 At. (2d) 68 (Decided Apr. 20, 1943).
410, 50 N. E. (2d) 65 (Decided July 13,

1943).
'Stephens v. Stephens. 319 I1. App. 292, 49 N. E. (2d) 560 (Decided Apr. 28,

1943).
'Hobson v. Dempsey, 7 N. W. (2d) 896 (Decided Feb. 16, 1943).
"4 Davis v. Davis, 70 Colo. 37, 197 Pac. 241 (1921).
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"And it may interest you to know," said Barrister, "that the
Williams case was sent back to the North Carolina court for further
proceedings. That court has just sustained the conviction upon which
the original appeal was based,- and the North Carolina court specifically
held that it may inquire into the bona fides of the residence. This is the
language of the second opinion in that case:
"Where one's domicile is, there will his marital status be also.
The marital relation is interwoven with the public policy to such
an extent that it is dissolvable only by the law of the domicile. So
the domiciliary state, and no other, furnishes the proper forum for
valid divorce proceedings.'

'16

"But my wife said she would fight me until Hell freezes over,"
said Jones, "and she would no doubt go to Nevada to contest the action.
I understand that most of the decisions you just mentioned were those
where one party went to Nevada and obtained service on the other by
publication, or by personal service in the state of defendant's residence.
Would it make any difference if my wife came to Nevada to contest the
action there?"
"Most assuredly, it would," replied Barrister. "Even if she were
to appear specially for the purpose of attacking the jurisdiction only,
your Nevada divorce, if one were subsequently entered, would be good
anywhere. This was decided by the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Davis v. Davis,1 7 decided in 1938. There a resident of the District of Columbia moved across the Potomac and established his residence
in Virginia. After the required residence period, he filed suit for divorce
and his wife entered a special appearance to contest the jurisdiction. This
contest having been held adversely to her, she refused to proceed further
in the case, and a decree was entered in favor of the husband. In contesting the validity of the decree in the District of Columbia, the Supreme
Court upheld it, saying:
"She may not say that he was not entitled to sue for a divorce
in the state court, for she appeared there and by plea put in issue
his allegations as to domicile, introduced evidence to prove it false,
etc. * * * Plainly, the determination of the decree upon that point
is effective for all purposes in this litigation."
effect.

Barrister continued: "A recent New York decision is to the same
8
This case held that when a wife sued for divorce in Nevada,

'Williams v. North Carolina, 223 N. C. Supp. 141, 29 S. E. (2d) Adv. Sh. 744
(1944).
"SeeBellv. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 21 Sup. Ct. 551, 45 L. ed. 804 (1901).
'305 U. S. 32, 83 L. ed. 26, 59 Sup. Ct. 3.
'In re Adams Estate, 45 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 494 (Decided Dec. 16, 1943).
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and the husband residing in New York entered a voluntary appearance
in the Nevada court, the divorce decree would be recognized as valid in
New York, and the court cited numerous decisions in support of this
holding. In view of these holdings, it might be well if you could get
your wife to go to Nevada to attack the validity of your domicile
there."" 9
"But," persisted Jones, "there is something else that bothers me."
"What is that?" replied the attorney.
"Well, you know, I was licked in two trials in Colorado, and I
haven't any new evidence other than that which was presented here. If
we go to Nevada, it will be necessary that we present the same evidence.
Isn't there some principle of law which bars the use of this evidence, once
the case has been adjudicated?"
"Not at all," promptly responded the attorney. "That point has
been adjudicated several times by the Nevada supreme court. Let us
suppose, for instance, that you bring an action on the ground that you
and your wife have lived separate and apart for more than three years
without cohabitation, 20 which gives the court discretion to grant a divorce, and your wife defended on the grounds of cruelty, desertion, nonsupport, and res adjudicata. The action would come squarely within the
decisions of Herrick v. Herrick,21 George u. George,2 2 and Jeffers v. Jef2
fers. 3
"In the Herrick case, the wife defended on the grounds of cruelty,
desertion, and the fact that the case had been tried three times in the
California courts, in two of which the court had found both parties
guilty of cruelty. A divorce granted to the husband was upheld by the
Nevada supreme court. The court said:
"The idea of a divorce on the ground stated is an idea of recent
origin. The legislative concept embodied in the statute is that
when the conduct of parties in living apart over a long lapse of time
without cohabitation has made it probable that they cannot live
together in happiness, the best interests of the parties and of the
state will be promoted by a divorce. * * * This is a comparatively
new idea in the law of domestic relations and divorce.
"9See also Durlacher v. Durlacher, 35 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Nev. 1940), where the
court said: "The law appears to be well settled that where a defendant enters a special
appearance in a case prosecuted in a state other than that of his residence for the purpose solely of raising a question of jurisdiction, and the decision is adverse to such
contention, and no appeal therefrom is taken, the question of jurisdiction becomes res
adjudicata, and cannot as to such action again be litigated."
mNFv. COMP. LAWS 1929, Supp. 1931-1941, §9467.06.
'55 Nev. 59,25 Pac. (2d) 378 (1933).
'56Nev. 12, 41 Pat. (2d) 1059, 97 A. L. R. 983 (1935).
'55 Nev. 201, 29 Pac. (2d) 351 (1934).
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"In other words, the granting of a divorce under this statute
does not depend upon the previous conduct of the petitioning
party. It is easy to conceive that the trial court under the circumstances of some particular case, might find it for the best interests
of both parties and of society that a divorce should be decreed irrespective of the earlier behavior of the petitioner.
"* * * It is unnecessary for us to determine if in any of the
California decrees the husband is adjudged to have been to blame
in causing the separation, and therefore estopped to maintain the
suit for divorce as contended by appellant. This contention is disposed of by our ruling that it is not an essential element of the
statute that a party be without fault to maintain an action for
divorce on the ground of separation for five 24 years without cohabition."

Barrister continued: "In the George case, 25 the wife defended by
showing a decree obtained in Ohio declaring her husband to be guilty
of cruelty and awarding her separate maintenance. The court made an
interesting social observation in this case when it said:
"It is evident that the conjugal life and the family life of the
parties are permanently disrupted. There is no inclination for and
no prospect of a reconciliation. Nothing is left of the marriage
relation but the legal tie. Respondent contends that, regardless of
these facts, petitioner should be punished for his misconduct by a
refusal of the trial justice to dissolve the marriage. If it appeared
that there was any advantage to the family, or to the state in
continuing the marital status, the divorce might well be denied.
But no such advantage is apparent. On the contrary, it is plain
that to compel the parties to continue in their present status would
be prejudicial to the parties and to their children. Such being the
situation, we are of the opinion that there was no abuse of judicial
discretion by the trial justice in granting the petitioner's prayer for
divorce.
"From these quotations, it is clear that the discretion which
the trial court is called upon to exercise depends not so much upon
the comparative rectitude of conduct of the spouses as upon the
probability of their being able to live together in such a manner
as to be for their best interest and the best interest of society. * * *
"In the Jeffers case 26 the wife set up four affirmative defenses, but
the lower court overruled them and was sustained. The court held that
the defendant was entitled to introduce evidence of the husband's faulty
2

Later changed to three years.
'Supra note 22.
'Supra note 23.

DICTA
conduct only for the purpose of influencing the discretion of the court
by the statute.
"The point is," added Barrister, "that the more evidence the wife
introduces as to the guilty conduct of her husband, the more likely the
court would be influenced in its discretion to grant a divorce, because
such evidence would demonstrate to the court that the parties should
not be bound
to each other in marriage, and that a divorce should be
27
granted."
"Well, that sounds fine," said Jones, "but there is one other matter
that occurs to me. Suppose my wife doesn't want to go to Nevada, and
decides she wants to take some steps in Colorado to prevent me from
proceeding in Nevada? Could she do this?"
"There are a number of decisions which hold that courts have a
right to enjoin an absent spouse from proceeding with an action for divorce in a foreign state," answered the attorney. "Of course, the local
court does not attempt to interfere directly with the courts of a sister
state, but acts in personam upon the spouse herself. There are three
principal reasons why courts of equity will issue such an injunction:
the foreign residence is not-bona fide and is obtained for the purpose of
the divorce only, which is in fraud of the foreign court and the deserted
spouse; it is an attempt to evade the laws of their common domicile;
and it would result in expense, inconvenience and hardship to cause the
deserted spouse to travel to Nevada to defend the action there.
"One of the leading cases on this subject is Usen v. Usen, 2s where
the court said:
"Since the courts of this state alone can dissolve a marriage of
its citizens dwelling within its borders, it follows that a divorce
proceeding brought by one of its citizens against another, in a
sister state, is contrary to law, and so an. infringement not only on
the rights of the spouse who has been sued, but also an infringement on the right of the state to determine the matrimonial status
of its own citizens."
"The Williams case," continued the lawyer, "has raised an interesting question even on this subject. The New York courts had refused
to issue an injunction to restrain an absent spouse from obtaining a foreign divorce 29 on the ground that the plaintiff in the equity suit had
'See also Parks v. Parks, 116 Fed. (2d) 556 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1940), and
Bassett v. Bassett, 51 Fed. Supp. 545 (D. Nev. 1943).
"136 Me. 480, 13 Atl. (2d) 738, 128 A. L. R. 1449 (1940), and an extensive annotation in 128 A. L. R. 1467. See also Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N. J. Eq.
94, 43 At. 97 (1899). a/f. 63 N. J. Eq. 783, 52 Ad. 625 (1902), 58 L. R. A.
484 (1903).
'Goldstein v. Goldstein, 283 N. Y. 146, 27 N. E. (2d) 969 (1940).
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nothing to fear, since under the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock,"30 the
courts of the foreign state had no jurisdiction to render a valid decree
against plaintiff, and therefore that judgment would be a nullity. Then
the Williams case expressly overruled the Haddock case. Would the New
York courts still follow this earlier decision? This point seems to be
clarified by a recent New York decision ' which granted an injunction to
restrain the absent spouse where he had not even commenced an action,
but merely threatened to do so. The court said:
"Inasmuch as the Williams case has overruled the jurisdictional principles laid down in the Haddock case, the threatened
injury is no longer illusory. Equity may fashion its remedy to
guard against the reality of harm."
"I understood you to say," interrupted Jones, "that the court acts
in personam, so that I would have to be served with the injunctionor at 'east notice of it. Now, if I'm in Ncvada. how could the Colorado
court have power to serve me with an injunction order outside this state?
And even if they did, I understand that a personam order is not effective
unless served on m? within the borders of this state."
"That may have been the law at one time," replied the attorney,
"but not now. While it is true that service must be obtained, it seems
that state boundary lines have been practically dissolved for this purpose
by a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. 32 This was a
case that went up from Colorado, 3 3 where our supreme court held void
a Iudgment in personam obtained in Wyoming on service in Colorado.
The Suprcme Court of the United States reversed the case, and used this
language:
* * * The authority of a state over one of its citizens is not
terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state. The state
which accords h~m privileges and affords protection to him and his
Frcperty by virtue of his domicile may also exact reci-irocal duties.
"*

* * The responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the

re'ationship to the state which domicile creates. That rela'ionship
is rot dissolved by mere absence from the state. The attendant
dut'es, like the rights and privileges incident to domicile, are not
d~pendent upon continuous presence in the state. One such incident of dom'cile is amenability to suit within th? state even during
sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and em23201 U. s. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. ed. 867 (1906).
3
'Oltarfh v. Oltarsh, 43 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 901 (Decided Sept. 7. 1943).
'Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 85 L. ed. 278, 61 Sup. Ct. 339, 132 A. L. R.

1357 (1941).
'Meyer v.Milliken. 101 Colo. 564. 76 Pac. (2d)
Milliken, 105 Colo. 532, 100 Pac. (2d) 151 (1940).

420 (1938), and Meyer v.
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ployed a reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of
the proceedings against him. * * *"

Barrister continued: "Even before the decision in the Millihen U.
Meyer case, many courts upheld the right to restrain an absent spouse,
based upon service outside the state, on the ground that a suit for an
injunction aimed to preserve a status in the state is a proceeding in rem,
even though it operates upon the person of the absent resident. 4 It
would appear, therefore, that service of a Colorado restraining order on
you in Nevada, would be effective and may subject you to a contempt
proceeding in Colorado, if you persist in proceeding with the suit in that
state, and then return to Colorado to resume your residence here.
"Well," continued Barrister, "is there anything else you'd like to
ask about?"
"No," replied Jones, "I've heard enough."
'Kempson v. Kempson, supra note 28; Knapp v. Knapp, 12 N. J. Misc. 599,
173 Atl. 343 (1934).
See also annotation in 128 A. L. R. 1467, 1477 (1940).
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Irrigation Confirmation Proceedings
By

CHARLES

J. BEISE*

Nearly all irrigation projects constructed in the past twenty-five
years involve, as the repayment entity, some form of irrigation district.
It may be a reclamation district, a conservation district, or an irrigation
district, financed by. public bond sales or repayment contract with a federal agency.a Regardless of the name of the entity or the method of
finance, nearly all such entities ultimately institute confirmation proceedings for the confirmation of the organization of the district, the issuance
and sale of bonds, or the repayment contract, and, in many instances,
water allotments to the individual user.' While water users' associations
are sometimes the contracting entity, their use is ordinarily limited to2
those projects which have an existing adequate canal system as security.
When used their incorporation and contracts are likewise confirmed.
The confirmation proceeding is a product of the West, the child of
California, born of necessity, 3 the original purpose being to make possible the sale of bonds to a doubting public. Besides irrigation works the
statute produced much litigation with an attendant lack of uniformity
in various states. By these proceedings, a landowner whose property is
*Member of the Colorado bar. Attorney for the United States Bureau of Reclamation, Salt Lake City, Utah.
aThe financial history of early irrigation district efforts is largely a story of defaulting bond issues caused mainly by inadequate capitalization, inadequate water supply,
and litigation. Few projects today are financed by bond issues, virtually all are federal
projects, the majority being those of the reclamation bureau. All federal projects grant
an adequate repayment period, the lack of which was a frequent cause of the early day
failure of districts.
'Statutqry provisions of Colorado are the following: WATER USERS' ASSOCIATIONS, 1935 COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 41, §§155-161; IRRIGATION DISTRICT LAW OF
1905, 1935 COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 90, §§377-431; IRRIGATION DISTRICT LAW OF
1921, 1935 COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 90, §§432-471; PUBLIC IRRIGATION DISTRICT
LAW OF 1935, 1935 COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 90, §§472-487; WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT ACT OF 1937, Colo. S. L. 1937, c. 266 and amendments. Statutory provisions of Utah are the following: IRRIGATION DISTRICTS 1917, UTAH CODE ANN.
100-9-1; Water Users Associations, general corporation laws; WATER CONSERVANCY
ACT 1941, UTAH CODE ANN. 1943, 100-11-1. For other states, see the statutes of
California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon and Washington. All involve the same principles. Other procedures, quo warranto, etc., are discussed in the
latter part of this article.
2
Of all reclamation bureau projects in Colorado, the Uncompahgre and Grand
Valley projects are the only two where such an entity is used. This form of entity
probably was used because of then existing requirements in the federal reclamation law
or because they were conceived at a time when irrigation districts were little known
(the early nineteen hundreds). The form of entity was not used because of adequate
security of then existing canals. Many supplemental water projects, particularly those
in Utah, formed in recent years use this form of entity.
8
ACT OF 1889, Statutes of Cal. 1889, c. 178, p. 212.
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to be burdened is granted an Anglo-Saxon opportunity to have his day
in court.
Because it is a special statutory proceeding largely confined to the
West 4 and only to those areas where irrigation is practiced, the subject
has heretofore been one of limited interest in a highly specialized field.
The future is otherwise. Projects conceived and investigated today
dwarf the dreams of early irrigation exponents. Modern equipment has
revolutionized the realm of possible diversions. 5 And these gigantic engineering feats of the postwar era are "multiple purpose projects" involving irrigation, domestic and municipal water supply, hydroelectric
power, flood control, recreation and navigation vitally affecting large
areas including the sparsely settled ranch or grazing regions where the
diversions are made to the largest metropolitan areas where waters are
delivered.
The future of confirmation proceedings is, consequently, one of
broader interest to the bar.
Virtually all states, in addition to providing for confirmation proceedings, have, as part of their irrigation district law, a statute of limita-

tions barring actions to question the legality of the district organization"
which is no part of the confirmatory acts. And these statutes of limitation do not preclude a landowner from challenging the legality of the
district organization where a confirmation proceeding is instituted after
the time limit has expired 7 since the limitation statute applies to proceedings other than "special proceedings.""
It is worth noting that confirmatory proceedings were not originally included in the Wright Act-the original irrigation district law
of California, adopted in 1887,1 and in 1889 an act "supplemental to
'Drainage districts of eastern and southern states, likewise flood control and conservation acts of various kinds provide for similar proceedings but are beyond the scope
of this article.
'Water tunnels six or seven miles in length were considered major undertakings
twenty years ago. The Colorado-Big Thompson project of Colorado utilizes a thirteen
mile tunnel, now nearly complete. Denver plans a system with a twenty-four mile
tunnel and in Arizona a project is now being studied involving a tunnel approximately
120 miles in length with a possible diversion capacity of 6.000 second feet.
'Colorado's latest statute on the subject precludes all remedies except quo warranto
proceedings commenced within ninety days from the time of the order establishing the
district. Colo. S. L. 1937, c. 266, §7. Utah adopted the Colorado act in toto, Laws
of Utah 1941, c. 99, §7, but this particular provision recently was held unconstitutional
in Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy Dist.. Utah ------145 Pac. (2d) 503
(Jan. 26, 1944). because of the Utah constitutional provision guaranteeing appeals.
No such constitutional provision exists in Colorado. Other Colorado statutes are:
IRRIGATION DISTRICT LAW OF 1905, 1935 COLO. STAT. ANN. c.90, §§377 ff.: IRRIGATION DISTRICT LAW OF 1921, 1935 COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 90, §§432 ff. For
similar proceedings in other states, see their statutes.
'Re Central Irr. Dist., 117 Cal. 382, 49 Pac. 354 (1897).
'This article does not assume to cover decisions involving these special statutes of
limitation, as they are not a part of the confirmatory proceedings.
'Act of March 7, 1887, Statutes of Cal. 1887, c. 34, p. 29.
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the Wright Act" was passed creating a special proceeding for the determination of the questions enumerated in the act. It is "an independent
statutory enactment * * * having reference * * * to the Wright Act, but
no more amendatory thereof than would be the special proceedings of
certiorari or mandamus."' 1 Colorado copied, to a large extent, the California statute11 and the origin of the law has been judicially noted. 2
As to the necessity of commencing such proceedings, the board of
directors have the power of decision and it is not mandatory 3 and cannot
be compelled by a landowner.
The proceeding is commenced by the filing of a petition by the
board of directors. Before one can allege anything, he must give his proceeding a caption. If the suit seeks confirmation of a repayment contract
and the district organization has already been confirmed, the heading or
caption of the former proceeding is proper, 14 and if the district is one
formed by court decree the subsequent proceedings are ordinarily captioned in the same manner." If the suit is the first proceeding it can be
captioned "In the Matter of * * * Water Conservancy District."16 Some
statutes require the petition to contain a definite allegation and the statutes of the state involved should be carefully read' 7 but where the petitioner has failed to make the necessary allegations, this defect has been
held not to be fatal on demurrer' I and is cured by the introduction of
evidence.' 0 Many statutes provide that allegations not denied shall be
deemed admitted or contain words of similar purport, hence, to take advantage of these provisions, each step in the proceedings being confirmed
should be alleged in detail and the resolutions, notices, etc., referred to
should be attached as exhibits. 2021 This leads to a voluminous petition,
but ultimately saves much time.
"Re Central Irr. Dist., 117 Cal. 382, 49 Pac. 354 (1897).
"Colo. S. L. 1901, c. 87, §§55-59, p. 198.
'Ahern v. High Line Irr. Dist., 39 Colo. 409, 89 Pac. 963 (1907).
"Surrage v. McKay, 60 Utah 117, 206 Pac. 722 (1922).
"American Falls Reservoir Dist. v. Thrall, 39 Idaho 105, 130, 228 Pac. 236
(1924).
"Upon appearance of a party objecting or answering the petition, the name of
such party is added to the caption as a respondent.
"See statutes.
"The writer has not found any reported proceedings that were started in a federal
court.
'Emmett Irr. Dist. v. Shane, 19 Idaho 332, 113 Pac. 444 (19 11).

"Re Peshastin Irr. Dist., 116 Wash. 440, 200 Pac. 88 (1921).
"Stevens v. Melville, 52 Utah 524, 175 Pac. 602 (1918). See also: California,
Re Madera Irr. Dist., 92 Cal. 296, 28 Pac. 272 (1891) ; Colorado, Wilder v. South
Side Irr. Dist., 55 Colo. 363, 135 Pac. 461 (1913) ; Idaho, Progressive Irr. Dist. v.
Anderson, 19 Idaho 504, 114 Pac. 16 (1911), seeking re-confirmation: Nampa and
Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Petrie, 28 Idaho 227, 153 Pat. 425 (1915) : Washington, Re
Peshastin Irr. Dist., 116 Wash. 440, 200 Pac. 88 (1921).
2"The district ordinarily is required to furnish a complete certified copy of its
pleadings, or the final decree entered therein, to the agency furnishing the capital.
therefore, it is well to make an extra copy of all documents and pleadings.
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Notice of the pendency of proceedings and serving of process is
ordinarily had by publication, although some statutes require posting in
addition. Decisions dealing with required notice in proceedings for the
formation of an irrigation district should not be confused with confirmatory proceedings. 22 The provisions of the statutes must be strictly complied with 23 and a change in the petition, by amendment, may necessitate
a re-publication . 24 The validity of service of process by publication has
been challenged and sustained. 25 Service of process, where provided by
statute, is not complete until the statutory period following last date of
publication has expired, which, in Oregon, is ten days. 26 The notice
must be addressed to the proper parties where so required by statute and
publication can be proved by affidavit of the publisher. 27 Where the
statute is silent as to who shall sign the notice, it has been held proper
for the clerk of court to do so. 2s The same decision furnishes the prece-

dent for and form of a motion and order for publication, although it is
common practice to dispense with a formal motion.
The appearance of parties after publication resisting the petition
can be by demurrer, answer or objection depending on the statutes.
29
Counter claims have been filed in opposition to the petition as well.
The demurrer has been held not to be well taken even though the petition omitted an allegation required by the statute, on the ground that no
injury resulted from the technical defect in the pleading. 30
The method generally used to contest proceedings is by answer
which may raise both factual and constitutional questions3 1 or objec'For a decision concerning notice in the formation of a district see Ahern v. High

Line Irr. Dist., 39 Colo. 409, 89 Pac. 963 (1907).

'Special attention should be given to the number of times the notice should be
published, as the acts are often inconsistent within themselves, i. e., Colo. S. L. 1937,
c. 266, §2, defines publication to mean three insertions, while §36 of the act dealing
with confirmation requires five publications.
'Modesto Irr. Dist. v. Tregea, 88 Cal. 334, 26 Pac. 237 (1891).

'Crall v. Poso Irr. Dist., 87 Cal. 140, 26 Pac. 797 (1890).
"Medford Irr. Dist. v. Hill, 96 Ore. 649, 190 Pac. 957 (1920).

'Re Riggs, 105 Ore. 531, 207 Pac. 175, 1005, 210 Pac. 217 (1922).
'Harney Valley Irr. Dist. v. Bolton, 109 Ore. 486, 221 Pac. 171 (1923).

'Progressive Irr. Dist. v. Anderson, 19 Idaho 504, 114 Pac. 16 (1911).
'Emmett Irr. Dist. v. Shane, 19 Idaho 332, 113 Pac. 16 (1911).
"California, Re Bonds of South San Joaquin Irr. Dist., 161 Cal. 345, 119 Pac.
198 (1911); Fogg v. Perris Irr. Dist., 154 Cal. 209, 97 Pac. 316 (1908): Re
Central Irr. Dist., 117 Cal. 382, 49 Pac. 354 (1897) ; Colorado, Wilder v. South

Side Irr. Dist., 55 Colo. 363, 135 Pac. 461 (1913) ; Idaho, Progressive Irr. Dist. v.
Anderson, 19 Idaho 504, 114 Pac. 16 (1911); Settlers Irr. Dist. v. Settlers Canal
Co., 14 Idaho 504, 94 Pac. 829 (1908) ; Oregon, Re Riggs, 105 Ore. 531, 207 Pac.
175, 1005, 210 Pac. 217 (1922); Washington, Re Peshastin Irr. Dist., 116 Wash.
440, 200 Pac. 88 (1921).
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tions.3 A reading of decisions generally indicates that the parties objecting are frequently urging grounds which should have been raised in the
inception of the proceedings to form a district rather than in confirmation suits.
While the statutes ordinarily make no provision for replications or
further pleas, they frequently refer to or incorporate the codes of civil
procedure and in those instances, further pleadings may be filed.
On issue being joined or default entered, a hearing is had. There is
a direct conflict in the decisions as to the nature and scope of the hearing:
Washington holding that confirmation proceedings are not de novo in
their nature and the hearing is limited to the record made before the
commissioners 33 and Colorado holding that the petitioners have the
burden of proof and must establish each step taken to form the district
by the common law rule of evidence.34 A prior decree of confir'mation is
properly admissible"5 to prove lawful organization of the district and the
scope of the hearing has been limited to those questions not considered in
prior hearings even though both sides had assumed it "opened the record.

-3"

6

7
There is little precedent as to the form of the decree to be rendered
and the safest practice seems to be to recite in detail that each step required
by the statute in forming the district, holding the election or assessing
benefits has been complied with.
Just what issues are settled by the proceedings and the decree is
highly speculative, as there exists not only a conflict between states, but
also within a state; state courts have expressly refused to follow the
United States Supreme Court. Thus the United States Supreme Court38
raised the query whether in advance of the issuance of bonds any case
existed that could even go to judgment and that the proceeding purports
to settle questions that may never arise, concluding, "it may well be
doubted whether the adjudication binds anybody" and the proceeding
is merely "one to secure evidence." This case had its origin in California
and four years later California expressly repudiated the United States

'Re Fort Shaw Irr. Dist., 81 Mont. 170, 261 Pac. 962 (1927).
In this case
the objections are treated as an answer.
'Re Wenatchee Reclamation Dist., 91 Wash. 60, 157 Pac. 38 (1916).
"'Ahern v. High Line Irr. Dist., 39 Colo. 409, 89 Pac. 963 (1907).
Sge also
Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Abila, 106 Cal. 365, 39 Pac. 793 (1895).
'Re Fort Shaw Irr. Dist., 81 Mont. 170, 261 Pac. 962 (1927); Wilder v. South
Side Irr. Dist., 55 Colo. 363, 135 Pac. 461 (1913).
"American Falls Reservoir Dist. v. Thrall, 39 Idaho 105, 130, 228 Pac. 236

(1924).
'Stevens v. Melville, 52 Utah 524, 175 Pac. 602 (1918).
M
Tregea v. Modesto Irr. Dist., 164 U. S. 179, 41 L. ed. 395, 17 Sup. Ct. 52
(1896).

DICTA
Supreme Court decision
attack.

9

145

and held that such decrees precluded subsequent

Any general observation is hazardous, but if one can be ventured
it is that if no constitutional or jurisdictional question of merit is involved in later proceedings the confirmatory decree will preclude an inquiry into the mechanics of the formation of the district or the election
on the repayment contract and, contra, if such constitutional or jurisdictional question is raised the decree does not preclude a suit challenging
its effect. Space will not permit an analysis of each case. Decisions holding the confirmatory procedure to be conclusive of some issues are listed
under note forty, 40 those holding that the issue raised was not concluded
are under note forty-one. 4 ' Some cases will be found under each note
where issues of procedure and substance are both involved. The effect
of the decree sometimes is challenged in purely collateral suits and has
been held not determinative of the issue involved 42 or the court has
ignored the decree completely 4 3 and never considered the decree. The
decree has been used in condemnation proceedings44 to establish authority
for the taking; it has been held that such a decree does not prevent the
exclusion of lands from a district where the owner was a non-resident
'People v. Linda Vista Irr. Dist., 128 Cal. 477, 61 Pac. 86 (1900).
"0California, People ex rel. Fogg v. Perris Irr. Dist., 132 Cal. 289, 64 Pac. 399
(1901) ; People v. Linda Vista Irr. Dist." 128 Cal. 477, 61 Pac. 86 (1900)
Colorado, Wilder v. South Side Irr. Dist., 55 Colo. 363, 135 Pac. 461 (1913) ; Idaho,
Progressive Irr. Dist. v. Anderson, 19 Idaho 504, 114 Pac. 16 (1911) ; Oregon
Short Line R. R. v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 16 Idaho 578, 102 Pac. 904 (1909) ; Smith
v. Progressive Irr. Dist. 28 Idaho 812, 156 Pac. 1133 (1916); Montana, O'Neill v.
Yellowstone Irr. Dist., 44 Mont. 492, 121 Pac. 283 (1912) ; Re Fort Shaw Irr. Dist.,
81 Mont. 170, 261 Pac. 962 (1927) : Nevada, Re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev.
321, 195 Pac. 327 (1921) ; Utah, Argyle v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 74 Utah 480, 280
Pac. 722 (1929); Jackson v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 66 Utah 404, 243 Pac. 107
(1926); Horn v. Shaffer, 47 Utah 55, 151 Pac. 555 (1915); Washington, Hanson
v. Kittitas Reclamation Dist., 75 Wash. 297, 134 Pac. 1083 (1918).
"U. S., Tregea v. Modesto Irr. Dist., 164 U. S. 179, 41 L. ed. 395, 17 Sup. Ct.
52 (1896) ; California, Fogg v. Perris Irr. Dist., 154 Cal. 209, 97 Pac. 316 (1908) ;
Miller and Lux v. Board of Supervisors, 189 Cal. 254, 208 Pac. 304 (1922), not a
confirmatory proceeding; People v. Perris Irr. Dist., 142 Cal. 601, 76 Pac. 381
(1904) ; Idaho, Oregon Short Line R. R. v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 16 Idaho 578, 102
Pac. 904 (1909) ; Nevada, Re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, 195 Pac. 327
(1921); Oregon, Northern Pacific Ry. v. John Day Irr. Dist., 106 Ore. 140, 211
Pac. 781 (1923) ; Utah, Jackson v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 66 Utah 404, 243 Pac. 107
(1926) ; Madsen v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 65 Utah 571, 239 Pac. 781 (1925) ; Horn
v. Shaffer, 47 Utah 55, 151 Pac. 555 (1915) ; Washington, Hanson v. Kittitas Reclamation Dist., 75 Wash. 297, 134 Pac. 1083 (1918).
'2 Interstate Trust Co. v. Steele, 65 Colo. 99, 173 Pac. 873 (1918).
"Montezuma Valley Irr. Dist. v. Longenbaugh, 54 Colo. 391, 131 Pac. 262
(1913).
"Rialto Irr. Dist. v. Brandon, 103 Cal. 384, 37 Par. 484 (1894).
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and not served with notice of the formation of the district;4 5 nor does it
prevent exclusion where an adequate water right existed.4"
Statutory provisions regarding appeals from the decree must be
complied with and thus appeals have been dismissed for failure to assign
specific errors47 or to perfect appeal within ten day statutory period. 4
Other forms of remedy exist in which the validity or constitutionality of the formation of a district or its contracts, bonds or assessments
can be tested. In retrospect it is hard to conceive why procedure for confirmatory proceedings was ever devised. Quo warranto, 49 prohibition,50
injunction,51 certiorari,- 2 quiet title53 and even general actions- have all
been used to the same end, or in cases which indicate that the validity of
districts or their acts could be determined.
"Scilley v. Red Lodge-Rosebud Irr. Dist., 83 Mont. 282, 272 Pac. 543 (1928).
This case goes farther in granting relief than almost any other case.
"Re Fort Shaw Irr. Dist., 81 Mont. 170, 261 Pac. 962 (1927). Contra, Colorado, Wilder v. South Side Irr. Dist., 55 Colo. 363, 135 Pac. 461 (1913) ; Idaho,
Smith v. Progressive Irr. Dist., 28 Idaho 8-12, 156 Pac. 1133 (1916) ; Utah, Jackson
v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 66 Utah 404, 243 Pac. 107 (1926).
'"Sunnyside Irr. Dist. v. Stephens, 21 Idaho 94, 120 Pac. 169 (1912).
"Palmdale Irr. Dist. v. Rathke, 91 Cal. 538, 27 Pac. 783 (1891).
"Quo warranto was used in the following cases: California, People v. Linda Vista
Irr. Dist., 128 Cal. 477, 61 Pac. 86 (1900) ; People ex rel. Fogg v. Perris Irr. Dist.,
132 Cal. 289, 64 Pac. 399 (1901) ; Colorado, Lockard v. People, 71 Colo. 213, 205
Pac. 944 (1922) ; People v. Lockhard, 26 Colo. App. 439, 143 Pac. 273 (1916);
Utah, State ex rel. Cluff v. Weber County Irr. Dist., 62 Utah 209, 218 Pac. 732
(1923).
'°Prohibition was used in Utah in State ex rel. Lundberg v. Green River Irr. Dist.,
40 Utah 83, 119 Pac. 1039 (191-1), wherein the fact that a confirmation decree
existed seems to have been ignored, and in the recent case of Patterick v. Carbon Water
Conservancy Dist ....... Utah --------145 Pac. (2d) 503 (Jan. 26, 1944).
"lnjunction was used in the following cases: C. C. A. (Colorado), Nile Irr.
Dist. v. Gas Securities Co., 248 Fed. 861 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918), wherein no emphasis
was placed on the confirmatory decree, and which is one of the few cases in a federal
court; California, Crall v. Poso Irr. Dist., 87 Cal. 140, 26 Pac. 797 (1890) ; Colorado, Montezuma Valley Irr. Dist. v. Longenbaugh, 54 Colo. 391, 131 Pac. 262
(1913); Oregon, Smith v. Hurlburt, 108 Ore. 690, 217 Pac. 1093 (1923); Utah.
Argyle v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 74 Utah 480, 280 Pac. 722 (1929), where it was
held that a confirmatory decree precluded all but jurisdictional questions; Horn v.
Shaffer, 47 Utah 55, 151 Pac. 555 (1915), which contains a good statement and
summary of the effect of confirmation proceedings: Washington, Hanson v. Kittitas
Rcclamation Dist., 75 Wash. 297, 134 Pac. 1083 (1918).
'Certiorari is seldom used: Miller and Lux v. Board of Supervisors, 189 Cal.
254, 208 Pac. 304 (1922).
'Quiet title: Idaho, Smith v. Progressive Irr. Dist., 28 Idaho 812, 156 Pac. 1133
(1916), suit to quiet title to water: Utah, Jackson v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 66 Utah
404, 243 Pac. 107 (1926).
"General suits: United States, Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Shepard, 185 U. S. 1, 46 L.
ed. 773, 22 Sup. Ct. 53 (1902), in which the court consistently ignored the fact that
a confirmatory decree existed; California. People v. Perris Irr. Dist., 142 Cal. 601, 76
Pac. 381 (1904) ; Oregon, Northern Pacific Ry. v. John Day Irr. Dist., 106 Ore. 140,
211 Pac. 781 (1923) Hanley Co. v. Harney Irr. Dist., 93 Ore. 78, 180 Pac. 724,
182 Pac. 559 (1919); Utah, Surrage v. McKay, 60 Utah 117, 206 Pac. 722 (1922).
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Cases involving confirmation proceedings wherein the United States
is involved are limited to those involving the bureau of reclamation and
in none of these cases is the United States a party to the suit. The only
case in the United States Supreme Court determines nothing except the
jurisdiction of that court on appeal from state court decree., 5 Another
decision contains no point of interest except the fact that the project was
financed by a bond issue to the United States-a practice not followed
in recent times.56 Inconsistencies between the statutes of Idaho and the
provisions of the federal reclamation law were aired in Nampa District
v. Petrie in the state court, 57 but the United States Supreme Court declined to comment on the point. 58 No point of special interest is involved
in the decision in Re Fort Shaw IrrigationDistrict,"9 involving a repayment contract with the United States.
This article is not intended as an encyclopedic treatment of the
subject. There may be many more equally valuable decisions that are
not cited herein, but it is hoped the practitioner will find an entrance
through this article.6" The applicability of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act to these proceedings is worthy of consideration, but
space precludes any discussion of this point.
'Petrie v. Nampa and;Meridian Irr. Dist., 248 U. S. 154, 63 L. ed. 178, 39 Sup.
Ct. 25 (1918).
"Nampa and Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Brose, 11 Idaho 474, 83 Pac. 499 (1905)

see also American Falls Reservoir Dist. v. Thrall, 39 Idaho 105, 228 Pac. 236 (1924).
"728 Idaho 227, 153 Pac. 425 (1915).
'Supra note 55. It is odd that more cases do not exist having to do with these
discrepancies, i. e., the federal reclamation laws make the waters of their projects appurtenant to land, a provision contrary to many state laws. The federal laws also limit
water to irrigable tracts of 160 acres, but no such limits appear in state statutes.
'81 Mont. 170, 261 Pac. 962 (1927)..
'Every reported decision in Utah and Colorado was read: lack of time precluded
this effort for other states.
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Board of Governors Meeting

At a meeting of the Board of Governors held in Denver on May
19 it was decided to make the raise in dues to the State Bar effective
July 1, 1944. This means that the dues payable to the state association will now be $5.00 per year instead of $3.00, as formerly.
The Board of Governors also authorized the president to appoint
a committee to study the service and sales tax law and its operations and
report to the next convention of the Colorado Bar Association with
recommendations concerning the continuation of this law. It was the
feeling of many members of the Board of Governors that this law should
be repealed as no longer necessary, in view of the surplus now existing
in the state treasury. Some of the members of the board, however,
stated that the tax might be retained and the funds used for purchasing
equipment and supplies and constructing buildings at state institutions.
A convention committee was appointed by Judge Clark at the
meeting, after the Board of Governors voted to hold an annual convention this year at Colorado Springs. The exact date of the convention is
stll to be selected, pending arrangements with hotels in that area. The
convention committee consists of Ben Sweet, chairman, Jean Breitenstein of Denver, and Roy Foard of Colorado Springs. The plans have
already been made to bring Judge John B. Knox of the federal district
court in New York, and David A. Simmons, who has been nominated
for the presidency of the American Bar Association, as speakers at the
convention.
The Board of Governors also approved a resolution permitting
judges of courts of record who may not be lawyers to become members
of the state association upon approval of the local association in the
area in which the judge may reside. It was suggested that a new classification in membership be made to take care of these judges during the
period while they remain in office. A committee consisting of Frank
Dolan of Boulder as chairman, Tom Keely of Denver, and Fred Videon
of Craig was appointed to draft the necessary changes in the by-laws
to make this recommendation effective.
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A Busy Court Where Lawyers May Not Enter
By OMAR E. GARWOOD*

A most interesting experience is to observe the Los Angeles small
claims court in action. It is presided over by a woman judge, a member
of the municipal court bench; who dispatches as many as eighty cases in
one afternoon session, many of them uncontested. The act creating the
court is found in title 1, chapter V-A, section 117, California Code of
Civil Procedure (Deering, 1941). Its jurisdiction is limited to money
*Of the Denver bar.
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demands not exceeding fifty dollars. Litigants must appear in person
and are not permitted to be represented by attorneys. The proceedings
are informal. Actions are commenced by the filing of a short affidavit
usually prepared by the clerk, although the paper may be prepared at
one's home or office and mailed to the clerk. There are no pleadings. A
short notice or summons to defendant is detached from the affidavit and
service is effected by registered mail; the return receipt is sufficient evidence of service to enable the court to proceed. The docket fee is one
dollar. Actions may not be brought on assigned claims; the real parties
in interest must appear. In practice the judge calls up the plaintiff and
defendant, listens to a brief statement by each, and enters judgment in
very short order. There is a table in front of the bench with toy automobiles, street cars and busses for demonstration purposes on small
collision claims.
No attachment or garnishment proceedings may issue, but plaintiff
may have execution as in other municipal court judgments. Plaintiff is
bound by the judgment and may not appeal, but defendant may appeal
to the superior court by giving notice and posting bond. He is penalized,
however, if he fails to win in the superior court, by having an attorney's
fee of fifteen dollars against him, together with all costs.
This popular court disposes of a tremendous volume of litigated
business to the great relief of other courts which have continuous difficulty in keeping up with their dockets. Summary and informal justice is
quickly administered; claimants obtain relief without the expense of
employing counsel or submitting to long delays and numerous continuances. Cases are invariably disposed of on return day; it is said that the
average time consumed in hearing is less than five minutes.
Lawyers, judges and citizens in Los Angeles appear to agree that
the small claims court has proven to be a definite forward step in the
direction of affording prompt, efficient and inexpensive means for adjudicating controversies which are meritorious but too petty to fit into
the channels in which ordinary courts administer justice. Other cities
will not fail to profit by following the California experiment.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Provisions for the establishment of small claims courts in Colorado were enacted by the 1939 legislature. Colo. S. L. 1939. c. 159, p. 544 ff., 1935
COLO. STAT. ANN. SUPP. c. 149A. No earnest attempts to create such courts, or to
make use of the procedure provided by the statute, have becn made to our knowledge.
This may be due, in part, to the simplicity of Colorado justice court procedure in the
ordinary money demand suit, which does not require even the filing of an affidavit
preliminary to the issuance of summons.
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Fiat Justitia Ruat Coelum
This little drama of frontier law proves that the principle preserved in the maxim lies deeper than language, and guides men wholly
ignorant of its origin. I had the story many years ago from the lips of
one of the actors. Its recital furnished my only reason for doubting his
veracity and I knew him well. Curiosity impelled me to investigate. I
found records confirming the principal facts, hence gave him the benefit
of the doubt as to details. Depending now upon a time-dimmed memory
I may miss the minutiae but, disguising names because some of the participants still live, I sketch the plot.
About 9:00 p. m. on a cold November night, in a little Colorado
cow town, since grown to a city, two young lawyers, Tom McNeary
and George Sampson, with four others of their ilk, sat in Sampson's
office playing poker. Whiskey and glasses were at hand and a jack-pot
had just been opened. Suddenly the door swung inward and, propelled
by a gust of wind and accompanied by flying snowflakes, Billy Russell,
a ranchman, blew in. As he thawed his thumbs by the roaring fire of a
sheet iron stove he cursed his luck. He had started to town to sell half, a
dozen chickens and buy sugar and tobacco. His wagon had broken down
and delayed him an hour. Now meat-market and grocery were closed
and he was half frozen. The boys invited him to aid the external fire
by internal applications and make free with their tobacco. They found
force unnecessary to induce his acceptance. As he rapidly thawed, his
keen eye swept the game. Observing his interest, they offered him a hand.
Seven players now wooed Fortuna and sacrificed intermittently to
Bacchus. Chickens, sugar and shivering team were forgotten. By 1:00
a. m. the largest stack of chips rose majestically before the recent victim
of misfortune. Someone suggested food and McNeary and Sampson
were commissioned in the commissary. With the optimism of John Barleycorn they roused the landlord of the town's only caravansary and
ordered a chicken dinner for six. "No chickens," retorted mine host.
The captains of the commissary went into a huddle. Eventually they
evolved a scheme. They offered to furnish two fowls for the repast and
pay the score with four others, and the deal was closed. They repaired
to Russell's wagon, lifted his coop and retired with the loot. When the
meal was ready they returned to the office, found the dealer in fowls
still on velvet and summoned the squad to refreshments. These consumed, they returned to their devotions and piously tended the altars
until dawn was breaking. Meanwhile misfortune had overtaken Russell.
His stack had melted to a few whites and his I.O.U.'s had become the
medium of exchange. McNeary secretly signaled Sampson and the two
silently withdrew. They agreed that the trick played upon the ranch-
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man, funny in his prosperity, had now taken on a touch of tragedy.
Sampson recalled that back of his office, and adjoining the enclosure in
which the butcher kept domestic fowls awaiting slaughter, the widow
Schmidt had a pen of chickens. A raid was promptly made thereon and
the empty coop of the unfortunate ranchman refilled. Morning was
now come and the breakfast hour at hand. Russell fed his team and
himself, sold the butcher the contents of his coop, bought his supplies
and returned to his lonely ranch and impatient frau, who sat like Tam
O'Shanter's sulking dame"Gathering her brows like gathering storm,
Nursing her wrath to keep it warm."
But he was soon torn from the bosom of his family by the long arm of
the law. Mrs. Schmidt had discovered her chickens in the butcher's pen
and made the welkin ring with her denunciation of the outrage. The
butcher hastily disclosed the source of his questioned title. Russell's
arrest was prompt and his trial came on apace. Meanwhile, at the instigation'of the conspirators, the butcher slaughtered his purchase. Russell's counsel and the deputy district attorney stipulated that the issue
should be presented in the J. P. court to a jury of three. It was further
agreed that the constable should summon seven good men and true and
from this list each side would strike two. "And so it was ordered and
so it was done." Russell and his wife swore that the chickens he brought
to town and sold to the butcher were hatched in his own hennery. The
butcher testified to the purchase and identified the property. Mrs.
Schmidt and two loyal neighbors deposed that the fowls found in the
butcher's pen belonged to her. The entire adult male population of the
town, reinforced by a few boys and twice as many dogs, listened spellbound to the arguments of the advocates. The jurors retired at 4:00
p. m., smoked and swapped stories until supper time, ate at the expense
of the vicinage, and returned Russell not guilty. He was duly thankful
to his peers. He had raised chickens, sold them and spent the proceeds.
The verdict cleared his character. The butcher was equally elated. He
had paid good money to an honest ranchman for his poultry. The verdict confirmed his bargain. But what of the widow? That her fowls
were in fact found in the butcher's pen no one doubted. Such a blot
must be wiped from the community's escutcheon. A caucus was called,
attended by court, counsel, constable, jurors and bystanders. It was
resolved that the lady of the scales and sword saw too little and her
bandage must be lifted. Mrs. Schmidt's loss was accordingly inventoried and a collection taken which made her whole. Thereupon the
citizens dispersed to their respective domiciles and peace once more
reigned in the little cow town. All due to the fact that McNeary was
the deputy district attorney and Sampson counsel for the defense, and
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the constable, and the three jurors so carefully selected for their ignorance
and impartiality, were the remaining gamesters, to whom the conscientious officer, when he summoned them for' duty, had, by consent of
counsel, confidentially communicated the source of supply of their midnight meal.
Frontier life had to be splashed with the romance of the Gaul and
spiced with the wit of the Celt to make it livable, but it was always dominated by the Anglo-Saxon's sense of justice.
H. P. B.

Repeal and Revision of Obsolete Laws
The Colorado Bar Association has an excellent opportunity to do
something toward the repeal and revision of obsolete laws. Last summer, at a meeting of the general interim committee of the Thirty-fourth
General Assembly, which some claim to be the most active interim committee ever appointed by a Colorado legislature, Governor Vivian suggested the necessity of repealing obsolete laws. It appears that many
statutes carried in the 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated are obsolete, of
no effect, or have apparently been superseded without being specifically
repealed. He reported that the legislature of another state has repealed
numerous obsolete statutory provisions, and recommended that the Colorado Bar Association be requested to take up this work in this state.
It would be a task too great for the association to undertake at this
time to read the statutes section by section, to find obsolete sections, and
recommend their repeal. However, every lawyer will, from time to time,
in his study of the statutes, come across sections which are not in effect
or which are unclear. If every lawyer would, upon discovering such a
section, drop a note to the chairman of the legislation committee, giving
the section number and stating what seems to be wrong, the committee
could accumulate a large number of suggestions for action by the legislature, and this task would not be unduly great for anyone.
E. Tyndall Snyder, of Greeley, is chairman of the legislation committee, and if every member of the bar discovering sections of our statutes which need to be repealed or revised will advise Mr. Snyder, the
association can be of material help to the legislature in clearing off our
statute books many unnecessary sections.
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They Didn't Pray for the Reporter
BY C. P.

GEHMAN*

These are days when prayer is in the air-and in the papers and
magazines. There are endless stories about the efficacy of prayer, especially among the armed forces of our nation. Our boys in uniform have
courage not only to face enemy fiendishness and guns, but to tell of their
prayers-they are really brave men. Not so many civilians have the
nerve to tell of their prayers. But whether they mention it or not, all
really do pray. The swearing of those who want to think they are unbelievers is only an admission of their desire to pray. Certainly it is quite
inconsistent to call upon God to condemn something when there is no
belief in God.
So I say that everybody prays-but they don't pray for the shorthand reporter. I have had a recent experience in reporting an unfortunate
church controversy. A number of weeks were spent in taking testimony
and other talk. The members of the commissions hearing the matter
and the people involved were all church people. The meetings were
opened with prayer and closed with prayer. They prayed for Divine
guidance in all their acts. They prayed for the witnesses. They prayed
for the members of the commissions. They prayed for counsel on both
sides, and for those directly involved. They prayed for our country.
They prayed for the armed forces on land and sea and in the air. They
even prayed for the Germans and the Japs. But they never uttered a
word of prayer for the reporter-and he really needed it at times!
There must be a reason for this attitude of ignoring the shorthand
reporter. But I am not sure what the reason is. I am confident in the
illustration I give that there was no deliberate slight of the reporter.
These were educated, intelligent men. Even if they did feel like looking
down on the reporter, that would have been the more reason why they
should have prayed for him.
The failure to pray for the reporter in these hearings is no new experience to shorthand reporters. It is the most common thing in the
world for the shorthand reporter to be utterly ignored as he works. I
have wondered whether it was because he was considered a sort of superman who could always take care of himself; or whether it was because
*Member of the Denver bar; reporter in the Denver district court: president Colorado state board of shorthand reporters, Reprinted by permission from the March,
1944, NATIONAL SHORTHAND REPORTER.
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he was deemed unworthy of notice. Maybe a little of each. Maybe they
think, "We pay him, what more does he want?"
Of course, to tell the truth, there are times when we are glad to be
let alone. A little like the man who complained to his wife that she never
expressed her love for him except when she wanted money; and her
answer was the query as to whether that wasn't often enough!
So while I mention this apathetic attitude toward the reporter, it
may be that it is just as well that it be so. Reporters themselves aren't
always prayerful people. I suspect that there may be more curses than
prayers in their hearts. By the way, it couldn't be, could it, that if we
prayed for the mumblers and the verbal speeders and the shouters instead
of hurling imprecations at them that they would mend their ways?
Many of us have noted in newspaper accounts of notable or notorious trials that they show pictures of the parties, the judge and the jury,
the clerk, the bailiff, the newsboys and others, but rarely a picture of the
shorthand reporter; and if the reporter happens to have gotten within
the range of the camera, he is just ignored as unimportant. This is
another evidence of the lack of thought of the shorthand reporter.
I am not really complaining. We are supposed to do our own praying anyhow. But there are few people who have any idea what a shorthand reporter does or how he manages to accomplish it. He is just someone about whom they know nothing and care less. It takes a shorthand
reporter to really appreciate the achievements of a shorthand reporter.
I often watch other reporters work, and I marvel at their skill, and wonder if they "have it all," until somebody calls for a question, and it is
repeated back from the notes with ease and accuracy- -generally!
Maybe if they knew us too well they would not think any the
better of us. I can no more tell why they don't pray for us than I can
tell why they pay their money to hear these crooners make their noises.
Most people are really like sheep. I guess some fellow just started ignoring the shorthand reporter and the others are just following along the
same lines. Just as somebody started the absurd spelling of the English
language, and people have followed it slavishly ever since. Once in a
while one of us starts a one-man (or one-word) crusade against the
orthodox spelling, but even for that we are given no special credit!
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Six Thousand Lawyers Studying Taxation
The constantly increasing importance of a complex federal tax system has emphasized the need for a basic knowledge of taxation by every
lawyer. The technical language of the tax statutes has discouraged many
attorneys from, offering a service in a field which should lie within the
domain of every lawyer.
Almost every type of business transaction today involves tax questions.
The purchase, sale, lease, development, or abandonment of any
kind of property usually results in some kind of taxable gain or deductible loss. The method employed by the attorney in handling a transaction will often increase or reduce the amount of tax to be paid by the
client.
Requests were received by the American Bar Association from lawyers in all parts of the United States to aid them in learning more about
the federal tax laws. The Practicing Law Institute, whose courses for
lawyers have been outstandingly successful, has cooperated with the
American Bar Association Section of Taxation in developing a practical
program of training for lawyers in tax matters.
A group of more than twenty tax attorneys, with Professor Erwin
N. Griswold of Harvard Law School serving as editor-in-chief, has prepared a unique series of easily understandable, concise, and authoritative
articles on the federal tax system. Any careful lawyer who will spend a
reasonable amount of time studying the pamphlets in this series should
obtain a working familiarity with the fundamentals of federal taxation.
The tax course is especially designed to meet the needs of practicing
lawyers. It presents the fundamental concepts of the federal income,
excess profits, estate and gift tax laws. The rules and their exceptions
are explained and illustrated. The methods to be employed in handling
typical tax matters are explained step by step. Suggestions for tax savings are pointed out. The emphasis is on the major principles of the tax
laws, and those matters which arise most frequently.
The course is issued in the form of fourteen pocket-size pamphlets,
printed in good size type with ample headings and indexes. They lend
themselves to convenient home and office study. Facsimile copies of
typical tax returns, accompanied by detailed explanations of how to
prepare tax returns of individuals, partnerships, and corporations are
included. The articles deal with Items of Gross Income; Deductions
from Gross Income; Exemptions and Credits; Accounting Methods;
Capital Gains and Losses: Recognition of Gain or Loss on Sales and
Exchanges and Basic Problems; Corporations; Preparation of Tax Returns; Partnerships, Estates and Trusts; Excess Profits Tax; Federal
Estate; Gift Tax; and Tax Practice and Procedure.
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There are more than 770 pages of text, supplemented by a 400page edition of the Revenue Code, and 240 pages on the new 1943
Revenue Act. The subscription fee for the entire series is $10.00. Subscriptions are received by the Practicing Law Institute, 150 Broadway,
New York 7, N. Y. The Practicing Law Institute is a non-profit institution conducting courses on taxes and other subjects.

Criminal Law Revision Committee Starts Work
Ten members of the criminal law revision committee of the Colorado Bar Association met recently at the first call to start its work,
according to an announcement made by the chairman, Ralph Carr. The
discussion resulted in a plan to appoint four sub-committees to start the
work by having frequent meetings so as to have material prepared for a
report to the bar association at its annual meeting in September. The
chairman hoped that this would then be rounded out and ready for submission to the general assembly in January, 1945. The sub-committees
named are as follows:
Co-ordinating: Jean S. Breitenstein, chairman, Frank D. Allen,
Richard H. Simon, Charles Rosenbaum, Stanley H. Johnson, Mollie 0.
Edison, Charles C. Sackmann.
Pardons and paroles: Robert W. Steele, chairman, Arthur C.
Gordon, Robert A. Smith, Claude W. Blake, Irl Foard, Charles T.
Mahoney.
Statutes: Anthony Zarlengo, chairman, 0. Otto Moore, James T.
Burke, Fred E. Dickerson, James N. Noland, Harry Behm, Frank H.
Hall, Walter Scherer, James R. Groves, Roy A. Payton, Edward Sherman, William Scofield, Percy Morris, Bertha V. Perry.
Procedure: Kenneth W. Robinson, chairman, Ira L. Quiat, Frank
L. Shaw, Carle Whitehead, Fred Mazzulla, William A. Mason, Frank
F. Dolan.

"Long, long years Pve rung 1ie curfew
from that gloomy, shadowed lower;
Every evening,just at sunset, it has
tolled the twtli-ht hour;

I have done my duty ever, tried to do
it just and rig'it,
Now Pm old I will notfalt-r,- Curfew
it must ring to-night."
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HARTWICK THORPE

CASE LAW CURFEWS
T

HIS thrilling poem, illustrating fidelity to duty
and quick action in meeting an emergency, is
again brought to mind by the annotation in 146 A.L.R.
on page 1463 under the title, "Curfew in war time."
The annotation contains the recent U.S. Supreme Court cases
upholding the proclamation of the Military Commander for the
Western Defense Command requiring that certain nationals and
persons of a certain national ancestry be within their place of
residence between the hours of 8:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M., which
period was referred to as the hours of curfew.
This is an illustration of the type of annotation, and the
speed with which the questions are covered, with exhaustive
briefs, in the various volumes of AMERICAN LAW REPORTS. With
over 14,000 of these questions now completely briefed in AMERICAN LAW REPORTS, A.L.R. has earned the reputation as a great
source of detailed information.
The spirit described by the poet in "Curfew Must Not Ring
To-night" is equally applicable to the zeal with which the A.L.R.
editors brief for the profession the practical questions arising
from day to day.
For information write

The Lawyers Co-op. Publishing Co., Rochester 3, N. Y.
Bancroft-Whitney Company

:-: San Francisco 2, Calif.

